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John Dewey in 20th Century Philosophy. Media Ethics in Applied Ethics.

Moral Reasoning and Motivation in Meta-Ethics. We often have some reason to do actions insofar as they promote outcomes or states of affairs, such as the satisfaction of a desire. But what is it to promote an outcome?

I defend a new version of 'probabilism about promotion'. According to Minimal Probabilistic Promotion, we promote some outcome when we make that outcome more likely than it would have been if we had done something else. This makes promotion easy and reasons cheap. This paper introduces a model for evidence denial that explains this behavior as a manifestation of rationality and it is based on the contention that social values measurable as utilities often underwrite these sorts of responses.

Moreover, it is contended that the value associated with group membership in particular can override epistemic reason when the expected utility of a belief or belief system is great. However, it is also true that it appears to be the case that it is still The conjecture made here is that we should expect this to happen only when the expected utility of the beliefs in question dips below a threshold where the utility value of continued dogmatism and the associated group membership is no longer sufficient to motivate defusing the counter-evidence that tells against such epistemically irrational beliefs.

Irrationality in Epistemology. There are at least two threads in our thought and talk about rationality, both practical and theoretical. In one sense, to be rational is to respond correctly to the reasons one has.


Call this substantive rationality. Call this structural rationality. According to the standard view, structural rationality is associated with a distinctive I think the standard view is mistaken. The goal of this paper is to explain why, and to motivate an alternative account: rather than corresponding to a set of law-like requirements, structural rationality should be seen as corresponding to a distinctive kind of pro tanto rational pressure—i.

Something similar is standardly assumed to be true of substantive rationality. On the resulting picture, each dimension of rational evaluation is associated with a distinct kind of rational pressure—substantive rationality with what I call justificatory pressure and structural rationality with attitudinal pressure. Requirements turn out to be at best a footnote in the theory of rationality.

Rationality, Misc in Epistemology. I offer an explanation for why certain sequences of decisions strike us as irrational while others do not. I argue that we have a standing desire to tell flattering yet plausible narratives about ourselves, and that cases of diachronic behavior that strike us as irrational are those in which you had the opportunity to hide something unflattering and failed to do so. Evolution of Morality in Normative Ethics.

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In defense of the virtue account, I argue that a novel view of When one has both epistemic and practical reasons for or against some belief, how do these reasons combine into an all-things-considered reason for or against that belief? The question might seem to presuppose the existence of practical reasons for belief. But we can rid the question of this presupposition. The problem has been thought to be intractable due to certain differences in the combinatorial properties of epistemic and practical reasons.

Here we David Miller argues that there are no good reasons, either sufficient or insufficient. I show that most of his arguments are invalid or unsound. Several of his arguments depend upon the false claim that every deductively valid argument is circular. I accept one of Miller's arguments for the conclusion that there are no good reasons which are less-than-sufficient. I accept one of his arguments to the conclusion that there are no probative sufficient reasons.

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But I explain how there are epistemic Skepticism, Misc in Epistemology. In particular, I want to explore how we might develop a Kantian conception of rationality that combines a virtue-theoretical perspective on the nature of rationality with a role for transcendental arguments in defining the demands this conception of rationality places upon us as thinkers. Transcendental Arguments in Metaphilosophy. Virtue Epistemology in Epistemology. It is my contention that the table of intentionality rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc. Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others view it, includes both conscious deliberative linguistic System 2 and unconscious automated prelinguistic System 1 actions or reflexes.

The basic problem is that one can say anything but one cannot mean state clear COS for any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in a very specific context. I show that this is a powerful heuristic for describing behavior. The Phenomenological Illusion oblivion to our automated System 1 is universal and extends not merely throughout philosophy but throughout life. Collective Intentionality in Philosophy of Mind.

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Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Epistemology of Mind, Misc in Philosophy of Mind. Evidence and Knowledge in Epistemology. Naturalism and Intentionality in Philosophy of Mind.

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Normativity of Meaning and Content in Philosophy of Language. Rule-Following in Philosophy of Mind. Before commenting on the book, I offer comments on Wittgenstein and Searle and the logical structure of rationality. The essays here are mostly already published during the last decade though some have been updated , along with one unpublished item, and nothing here will come as a surprise to those who have kept up with his work.

Like W, he is regarded as the best standup philosopher of his time and his written work is solid as a rock and groundbreaking throughout. However, his failure to take the later W seriously enough leads to some mistakes and confusions. One word- two or many distinct uses. However, his point that propositions permit statements of actual or potential truth and falsity, of past and future and fantasy, and thus provide a huge advance over pre or protolinguistic society, is cogent.

If I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that. Free Will and Neuroscience in Philosophy of Action. Linguistics in Cognitive Sciences.

Reason - CS Lewis Society of California

Neuroscience in Cognitive Sciences. This work can be regarded as an outline of behavior human nature from our greatest descriptive psychologist. In considering these matters we must keep in mind that philosophy is the descriptive psychology of higher order thought DPHOT , which is another of the obvious facts that are totally overlooked —i.

Sadly, Wittgenstein's brilliant exposition of behavior is still understood well by only a handful.

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In between he is describing how System 1 the automatic functions of the brain is described by intransitive uses of verbs such as seeing, remembering i. He spends much time showing that disposition words S2 such as thinking, meaning, judging, interpreting, knowing, understanding, believing, intending, reading, calculating, recognizing, comparing, deciding, counting, imaging etc.

They are abilities to act. But is Kant best read as pursuing a constitutivist approach to meta- normative questions? And if so, in what sense? The result of this investigation will be that, while Kant Moral Constructivism in Meta-Ethics. Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple.

Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience.